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Abstract
We suggest a foundational representation for the notion of belief and belief change process based
on the notion of an epistemic state and its associated Scott consequence relation. We study the basic
belief change operations in this framework and compare the resulting theory with related approaches.
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1. Introduction
The problem how to revise our beliefs or theories in response to new information
can be seen as one of the fundamental problems in logic, with immediate potential
applications ranging from philosophy to databases and artificial intelligence (see [11] for a
comprehensive survey of current approaches in this area and their applications).
It was realized quite early that the set of beliefs alone is insufficient for grounding a
nontrivial belief revision process; some more structure need to be imposed on (or, more
exactly, discerned from) our epistemic states in order to guide our decisions about what to
retain and what to retract in the process of revising our beliefs with new data. The need
for such a structure is especially evident if the belief set is considered to be a deductively
closed theory. In fact, different approaches to the problem of belief change can be classified
first of all on the basis of what structure they impose on belief sets.
The most influential approach, the AGM theory of belief change [1,8], has considered
belief revision as a process of changing (deductively closed) belief sets based on some
selection function choosing among their maximal subsets that are consistent with the new
data. The need for such a preference mechanism, in addition to the belief set itself, stems
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from the fact that neither each such subset taken alone (“maxichoice” revision) nor their
common part (“full meet” revision) are appropriate as reasonable solutions. The AGM
theory has suggested a systematic approach to the problem in this framework both in terms
of general rationality postulates it should satisfy and in describing semantic representations
that conform to these postulates.
The AGM approach has often been criticized for taking deductively closed sets of
propositions as representing belief states. It has been argued that most such propositions
are purely derivative and arise simply as logical consequences of other, more basic, or
explicit, beliefs we have. Consequently, such derived beliefs should be withdrawn when
we remove beliefs that served as their justification. Speaking more generally, deductively
closed belief sets do not account for the fact that some of our beliefs may be reasons for
other beliefs (cf. similar remarks made by Gärdenfors in [8], Section 3.5). In particular,
maximal subtheories of a belief set cannot be always considered as appropriate options for
choice, since they may contain beliefs that have already lost their justification.
The above criticism has developed into an alternative approach according to which
the corpus of beliefs is seen as generated by some (usually finite) set of propositions
called its base (see, e.g., [6,13,17,23]). Changes of such base-generated belief sets are
determined by changes in their underlying bases: deletion of a proposition should amount
to deletion of some of the basic propositions that served as its ground, while a typical
revision should amount to adding propositions to the base. Among other virtues, such a
representation drastically reduces the set of available alternatives and consequently has
definite computational advantages. It allows also to avoid some controversial features of
the AGM theory, such as the famous postulate of recovery (see [22]).
The role of justification in belief acceptance, and the destiny of derived beliefs in
performing belief change operations lie at the heart of the dispute between coherentist and
foundationalist approaches to belief and knowledge (see, e.g., [9,18,28]). In this respect,
the AGM theory is usually interpreted as a realization of the coherentist approach, while
the theory of base change is seen as an embodiment of the foundational approach. The
approach that will be suggested below can also be seen as belonging to the foundational
trend, since it will presuppose that the structure of our epistemic state is determined
ultimately by certain dependence relations holding among our beliefs. Our proposal,
however, will be significantly different from the base-generation approach. The main
reason for the difference lies in the necessity to comply with still another important
requirement on adequate representations of epistemic states.
It would be natural to require that belief change operations should act as functions
transforming our epistemic states into new epistemic states. To perform this role, however,
they should satisfy the principle of categorial matching (see [11]): the representation of the
epistemic state after a change should be of the same kind as that before the change. Apart
from aesthetic considerations, compliance with this principle seems to be essential for an
adequate representation of iterated belief change operations.
The (complicated) relations of the AGM approach with the principle of categorial
matching are discussed in a companion paper [3]. Unfortunately, it was rightly argued
by Gärdenfors and Rott in their review [11] that the base-generation approach also has a
problem with the principle: though a base determines the new belief set resulting from a
change, it does not always determine a natural new base after the change. For example,
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deleting p ∧ q from a belief set generated by a base {p,q} should remove either p or
q . If the change has to be minimal, and the two basic propositions are independent (and
equally preferred), we obtain two equally plausible sub-bases, {p} and {q}, that satisfy all
the requirements. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that the new, contracted belief
set should coincide with what is common to these two options, namely, with Th(p ∨ q).
But unfortunately, there is no natural contracted base that would produce this result.
Consequently (and contrary to the hope expressed in [14]), the base-generation approach
also creates difficulties for representing iterated belief changes.
In fact, the above extremely simple example brings to surface the common problem
for practically all current approaches to belief change. The problem can be described as
follows: most accounts often force us to choose in situations we have no grounds for choice.
True, imposing preferences on the available alternatives, as is done in many approaches,
can sometimes “break ties” in such situations. However, it should be clear that such a
solution cannot be comprehensive unless the alternatives are always totally ordered with
respect to preference, and this is hard to achieve in most situations.
An interesting aspect of the above problem arises in the case of the AGM representation.
The principle of informational economy that lies at the base of the AGM approach points
out to maximal subtheories of the belief set as the only reasonable options for choice.
However, the suggested “partial meet” construction takes intersection of such theories as
the final solution. As was rightly argued by Isaac Levi in [20], such a solution violates
the very principle of informational economy it was based on, since the intersection of
maximal subtheories is already not maximal by itself, and hence is far from being optimal
in the sense of preserving as much information as possible. It is important to observe also
that a similar attempt to take intersections of preferred alternatives in the case of the base-
generated representation turns out to be completely inadequate: thus, in the above example
the intersection of the two preferred sub-bases {p} and {q} is simply empty. Speaking more
generally, we will argue in the paper that taking intersections of the preferred alternatives
may lead to a loss of information. This loss is not “seen” so far as we are seeking only to
find belief sets produced by one-step changes, but it will be revealed in subsequent changes.
Our approach to the above problem will amount roughly to retaining all the preferred
alternatives as parts of the new epistemic state. We claim that all these alternatives should
remain vivid in the representation of the resulting state rather than transformed into a
single “combined” solution. Otherwise we may lose important information. As we will
see, this does not prevent us from determining a unique resulting set of beliefs; but we
should remember more than that.
Our epistemic states will consist of a set of (admissible) belief sets of the agent. In
addition, a suitable principle of belief acceptance will determine a unique set of beliefs
associated with a given epistemic state. We will describe some natural belief change
operations on epistemic states that will generate, in turn, the corresponding operations
on associated belief sets. In this way our construction will satisfy the above-mentioned
principle of categorial matching. In addition, these operations will help to explain how
epistemic states can be produced starting from some “initial” states.
As we will discuss later, the main justification for our notion of an epistemic state can
be found in current works on nonmonotonic reasoning that suggest a more fine-grained
and plausible view of how our beliefs are formed. In addition, there are also at least two
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other theories of belief change that can be seen as sources of our account. The first is a
theory of Fagin et al. [5] that suggested a representation of databases in terms of flocks of
theories; this construction will be extensively discussed in what follows. The second one is
a theory of relational belief change proposed by Lindström and Rabinowicz [21]; the latter
suggested to treat belief revision as a relation holding between the initial belief set and a
number of its candidate revisions. This theory is considered in the companion paper [3].
It turns out that epistemic states in our sense can be described syntactically using
so-called Scott consequence relations [7,27]. The rules of these consequence relations
will reflect basic dependence relationships holding among our beliefs. Due to the
correspondence between epistemic states and Scott consequence relations, belief change
operations on epistemic states will be representable also as operations on consequence
relations.
We will see that base-generated belief states are representable as a special case of our
epistemic states. Furthermore, we show in [3] that the notion of epistemic entrenchment
is intimately connected with Scott consequence relations. Due to this connection, the
AGM theory will be also subsumed by our approach, though it will acquire a different,
foundationalist interpretation. Thus, the suggested framework provides, in effect, a
common foundationalist “umbrella” for the current approaches to belief change.
2. Epistemic states and their belief sets
To begin with, let us look at our epistemic states as “black boxes”. As their primary
function, they produce belief sets. This is not, however, all that is hidden in them,
since otherwise we would not be able to make reasonable changes in response to new
information. We can get some grip on this hidden structure, however, if we take it to be
responsible for producing certain subsets of the belief set in case we are required to delete
some of our beliefs. These contracted belief sets can be seen as results of decomposing the
source belief set into “well-formed” parts generated by the underlying structure. Only such
subsets can be considered as serious options for subsequent changes made to the epistemic
state. Note that each epistemic state has its own “signature” in this respect, even if the
associated belief set happens to be the same; each epistemic state singles out its own set of
contracted belief sets. And it seems natural to try to take this set of “well-formed” subsets
as giving a primary description of the source epistemic state, as something determining
(or reflecting) its structure. Guided by this idea, we can reverse the picture and assign an
epistemic reality to such belief sets as something that already were there before we made
contractions. Then an epistemic state will look like an iceberg with the belief set as its
“visible” top and the set of its well-formed or “admissible” subsets as constituting its body.
In fact, we will give below a number of reasonable ways how such a structure could be
created.
The above picture can be seen as giving a preliminary informal background for our
understanding of epistemic states. However, the picture is still insufficient for resolving the
second main problem mentioned in the introduction, namely the problem of choice. As we
said, contracting the initial belief set may often leave us with a number of equally plausible
alternatives. And instead of trying to transform these alternatives into one combined belief
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set, we suggest to keep all of them as parts of the new epistemic state. This means that
our epistemic states will not always have a unique “top” belief set, but will have instead a
number of “peaks”, each representing a maximal plausible set of beliefs. Such epistemic
states will be seen as directly representing epistemic situations involving a number of
different plausible “views of the world”.
The above mentioned epistemic situations are actually quite familiar in studies of
nonmonotonic reasoning. In fact, the latter have enriched us with a new general approach
to the notion of belief according to which our beliefs are formed with the help of defaults,
or expectations, that we are willing to accept in the absence of evidences to the contrary. In
many situations, however, different defaults may conflict with each other, and this usually
gives us a number of maximal “coherent” subsets of defaults forming a basis for different
plausible sets of beliefs we can hold in such situations. Extensions of default theories
in Reiter’s default logic [25] reflect this feature of default-based systems. An abductive
system of Poole [24] has given a very simple and natural representation of such systems
in terms of possible scenaria formed by admissible sets of defaults. Propositions that are
inferred (“explained”) by maximal admissible scenaria are seen as representing potential
beliefs we can hold about the situation.
If we compare the above description with the “traditional” representation of belief states
as deductively closed sets of beliefs, we immediately notice two main differences. First,
potential default-generated beliefs may often be incompatible with each other, and even if
they are not, they cannot be freely combined to produce new plausible beliefs. This means
that such potential beliefs do not always form a deductively closed set. Second, a belief
set derived from a given admissible set of defaults is not homogeneous; not all deletions or
additions to this belief set constitute justifiable belief sets, but only those that are supported
by some admissible sets of defaults. This means, in particular, that our potential beliefs are
correlated, and that some of them serve as reasons, or justification, for others.
It is instructive in this respect to compare the above picture with a general theory
of nonmonotonic inference that has been developed by Gärdenfors and Makinson [10].
According to this theory, nonmonotonic inferences are formed with the help of expectations
that are added as auxiliary assumptions to the premises. The authors have shown, in
particular, that Poole system can be considered as a special case of their framework
with defaults serving as such expectations. Also, the authors have established a close
correspondence between this expectation-based representation and their previous work on
belief revision. However, this correspondence was shown to hold on the condition that
the set of expectations is jointly consistent and deductively closed. These assumptions,
however, are inappropriate for general Poole systems and mark actually the distinction
between the AGM approach and the theory suggested in the present paper.
We are ready now to introduce our definition of an epistemic state.
Definition 2.1. An epistemic state E is a set of deductively closed theories. Each u ∈ E
will be called an admissible belief state of E .
Admissible belief states will represent potential belief sets that are actually envisaged
by the agent; borrowing (and taking literally) Isaac Levi’s terminology, they will represent
what is considered by the agent as a serious possibility. The very restriction on such
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possibilities indicates that our potential beliefs are correlated. As we shall see, our
epistemic states can indeed be described in terms of dependence relationships holding
between propositions. As a special case, such dependence relations provide justifications
for some of our beliefs in terms of other beliefs we have. In this way the framework of
epistemic states will allows us to represent a general foundationalist approach to belief
change. Still, our version of foundationalism will be very moderate (and in this way will
avoid much of the criticism raised against it). Thus, the net of dependencies will not
be assumed in general to have a well-founded acyclic structure starting with universally
acceptable self-justified postulates. In fact, all we assume is that there is some dependence
relation between propositions that should be respected in producing revised epistemic
states.
To avoid possible complications at this stage, we will consider in the rest of this section
only epistemic states consisting of a finite set of theories.
An epistemic state gives raise to a natural notion of belief acceptance that we are going
to describe in the next definition. In fact, this definition can be immediately discerned from
the above informal description of epistemic states as generated by certain sets of defaults
or expectations.
Definition 2.2. A proposition will be said to be believed in an epistemic state E if it
belongs to all (set-inclusion) maximal belief states from E . The set of all propositions
believed in E will be called a belief set of E .
Thus, even if an epistemic state contains multiple maximal belief states, we can still
believe in propositions that belong to all of them. It is important to observe that the
AGM theory of belief change also presupposes the above criterion of belief acceptance
with respect to propositions that “survive” a change. Thus, a proposition will belong to
a contracted belief state if it belongs to all (selected) maximal sub-theories of the initial
state that do not include the proposition being contracted. On our approach, this is how we
should accept our beliefs from the very beginning.
Our principle of belief acceptance can be viewed as providing a foundationalist
representation for the notion of belief. As in a purely coherentist account, the acceptability
of beliefs is determined, ultimately, by their compatibility (“coherence”) with other
potential beliefs, rather than by their derivability from some basic postulates. Still, this
compatibility is constrained by compliance with the dependence relationships embodied in
the composition of the underlying epistemic state.
Belief change operations will be defined below as functions from epistemic states to
epistemic states. Accordingly, though any epistemic state determines an associated belief
set, changes of the latter will be determined by changes made to the underlying epistemic
state.
The belief set associated with an epistemic state E is actually an intersection of maximal
belief states from E , and hence it does not always constitute an admissible belief state of
E by itself. The latter will hold, however, in an ideal situation when an epistemic state
contains a unique greatest belief state. We will call such epistemic states determinate in
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what follows. 2 Such states can be seen as subsuming the two “traditional” representations,
discussed in the introduction.
The suggested notion of an epistemic state allows for a richer repertoire of epistemic
attitudes that are representable in this framework as compared with “plain” belief sets (see
[8] for discussing epistemic attitudes expressible in different representations of epistemic
states). For example, a proposition that is not believed may still constitute an admissible
belief with respect to an epistemic state if it belongs to at least one admissible belief
state. A proposition A will be said to be disbelieved in an epistemic state E if there is no
admissible belief state in E that includes A. This notion of disbelief highlights still another
“foundational” feature of our epistemic states: a proposition A is disbelieved if it is not
supported by any admissible belief state (even though it may be logically consistent with
all of them). Notice, however, that for determinate epistemic states this notion of disbelief
is reducible to a simple absence of belief.
Our epistemic framework allows to define also a distinction between believed and known
propositions. We will say that a proposition is known (or “firmly believed”, if you prefer) in
an epistemic state E if it belongs to all belief states from E . The latter, somewhat unusual,
notion of knowledge 3 will play only a marginal role in the present study dealing with
belief change. Still, it will be instructive in distinguishing changes in beliefs from changes
in knowledge. In particular, our belief change operations will not change what is known to
the agent.
2.1. Grounded, base-generated and default-generated epistemic states
As we said, a natural understanding of epistemic states consists in seeing them as
generated by some set of default propositions. For example, a Poole system can be seen as
an epistemic state with admissible belief sets corresponding to logical closures of allowable
sets of defaults. Poole’s preferred scenaria will correspond then to maximal admissible
states. Epistemic states of this kind can be described as follows.
Let Th be an arbitrary classical consequence relation and B a set propositions. An
epistemic state will be said to be generated by a set of propositions B if it coincides with
the set of theories {Th(B) | B ∈B}. Epistemic states that are generated in this way by some
set of propositions will be called grounded ones. Note that in the case of a finite underlying
language, all epistemic states will be grounded.
Grounded epistemic states are highly sensitive to the actual sets of propositions that
generate them. For example, a state generated by a set {p,q} will certainly be distinct from
the state generated by a single proposition {p ∧ q}; though both determine the same belief
set, their behavior in belief change will be different. Notice, however, that this does not
make the notion of a grounded state syntax-dependent. Rather, it reflects an idea that some
of the believed propositions are considered as reasons, or grounds, for others.
It turns out that grounded epistemic states are intimately connected with a representation
of databases in terms of flocks of theories suggested by Fagin et al. in [5].
2 Thanks to the anonymous referee who suggested the name.
3 Notice that our framework is thoroughly epistemic and does not involve any reference to objective truth.
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By a flock we will mean an arbitrary set of sets of propositions F . An epistemic state
will be called generated by a flock F if it coincides with a set of theories
{Th(w) |w⊆ u, for some u ∈F}.
A flock will be called finite if it consists of a finite set of finite sets of propositions. To
simplify the discussion, we will restrict our attention here to finite flocks. Then it is easy to
show that the notion of a flock-generation is reducible to that of a grounded epistemic state.
For a set of propositionsw, we will denote byw∧ the set of all conjunctions of propositions
chosen from w. Now if F is a flock, we will denote by BF the set of propositions⋃{
u∧ | u ∈F}.
Then it is easy to show that an epistemic state generated by a finite flock F is generated,
in effect, by the set of propositions BF . Notice also that any set of propositions B can
be identified with a flock FB consisting of all singular sets {B}, where B ∈ B. This
shows that the two notions are basically equivalent in the finite case. An extension of this
correspondence to the infinite case will be given later in the paper.
As in the present paper, the flock representation of databases was used in [5] to define
their contractions (deletions) and revisions (insertions). Our results, however, will be very
different from that of [5]. The main difference stems from the fact that the authors of [5]
adopted a “strongly foundationalist” criterion of belief acceptance and treated a proposition
as valid with respect to a flock of theories if it belongs to all theories in the flock.
To demonstrate the difference with our understanding of belief, let us say that two flocks
are equivalent if they generate the same epistemic state. Since all belief change operations
that will be introduced in the paper are definable in terms of the associated epistemic states,
equivalence of two flocks will imply that they will be equivalent under any future change,
or equivalent forever in the terminology of [5]. Now, let F be a flock and u a set of
propositions such that u ⊆ w, for some w ∈ F . Then it is easy to see that flocks F and
F ∪ {u} give raise to the same set of generating propositions BF , and consequently they
are equivalent in the above sense. This shows, in effect, that inclusion-maximal elements of
a flock are sufficient for determining the associated epistemic state. Consequently, only the
latter will be relevant for determining subsequent changes of these states. According to the
approach of [5], however, the validity of propositions with respect to a flock is determined,
in effect, by minimal sets belonging to the flock. As we will see, this seemingly small
distinction produces drastic differences in the behavior of the corresponding belief change
operations, and makes the approach of [5] less plausible and far more complex than the one
suggested below. For example, the following simple lemma gives a necessary and sufficient
condition of equivalence for finite flocks (this problem was retained open in [5]).
Lemma 2.1. Two finite flocks F1 and F2 are equivalent modulo Th iff each proposition
from BF1 is Th-equivalent to a proposition from BF2 and vice versa.
The proof follows immediately from the fact that in both cases the generated theories
of an epistemic state will have the form Th(B), for some B ∈ BF . The following example
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from [5] illustrates the above result. This example was used in [5] for showing that their
sufficient criterion of equivalence is not a necessary condition.
Example 2.1. Consider the following two flocks
F1 =
{{A,B,A↔B}, {A,A↔ B}, {B,A↔ B}},
F2 =
{{A,A↔ B}, {B,A↔ B}}.
It can be easily checked that in both cases the set BF of generating propositions amounts
to {A,B,A↔ B}. Consequently, the two flocks are equivalent and reducible both to the
flock {{A,B,A↔ B}}.
Base-generated states
Following Hansson [14], we will see a base-generated belief state as a pair (B,Th),
where B is a base and Th a classical consequence relation. To begin with, we identify such
belief states with epistemic states that are generated by all subsets of the base.
Definition 2.3. An epistemic state E will be called base-generated by B with respect to
Th if it coincides with a set of theories {Th(u) | u⊆ B}. In this case B will be called a base
of of E .
As can be immediately seen, base-generation is a special case of flock-generation when
the flock contains only one set of propositions. Consequently, any base-generated epistemic
state will be grounded.
A set of propositionsB will be called ∧-closed, if, for any A,B ∈B, A∧B also belongs
to B. Then it is easy to see that an epistemic state is base generated if and only if it is
generated by a ∧-closed set of propositions, namely by B∧.
Propositions from a base of a base-generated epistemic state can be freely combined in
order to produce new admissible belief states. In particular, it is easy to see that Th(B) is
the greatest theory, or belief set, of such an epistemic state, while Th(∅) is its least theory.
Thus, base-generation implies determination. Notice, however, that the base B has not been
assumed to be classically consistent; if B is inconsistent, the generated belief set will be
inconsistent. This case actually marks a difference between base-generation and default
generation described below.
As we will see, base generated states are inappropriate as a general framework for belief
change, since they are not invariant under some natural belief change operations. Still, they
correspond to a most simple and common kind of epistemic situations.
Default-generated states
Common default-type systems of nonmonotonic reasoning impose various constraints
on acceptable combinations of defaults. In a simplest case, however, the only restriction
on such combinations amounts to preserving logical consistency. In this case defaults can
be identified with supernormal defaults of Reiter’s default logic [25], that is, with normal
defaults without pre-requisites (see, e.g., [4]). Epistemic states generated by such defaults
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are quite similar to base-generated states, with the only distinction that only consistent sets
of defaults are considered as admissible:
Definition 2.4. An epistemic state E will be called default-generated by B with respect to
Th if it coincides with a set of theories
{Th(u) | u⊆ B & u is consistent}.
In this case B will be called a default base of E .
As can be seen, if the set B is not jointly consistent, the resulting default-generated
epistemic state will not be determinate. Still, it will be flock-generated by maximal
consistent subsets of defaults.
3. Supraclassical Scott consequence relations
In this section we describe a logical formalism that will provide a syntactic description
for epistemic states.
We begin with a brief description of a general sequent calculus called Scott consequence
relations [27]. We refer the reader to [2,7] for a more detailed exposition.
Scott consequence relations can be seen as a “symmetric” generalization of Tarski
consequence relations. They involve rules or sequents of the form a ` b, where a and
b are finite sets of propositions. An informal reading of such sequents in this paper will be
If all propositions from a are believed (or accepted), then one of the propositions
from b should also be believed (accepted).
A set of sequents is called a Scott consequence relation if it satisfies the following
conditions:
A `A; (Reflexivity)
If a ` b and a ⊆ a′, b⊆ b′, then a′ ` b′; (Monotonicity)
a ` b,A a,A ` b
a ` b . (Cut)
The notion of a sequent can be extended to include infinite sets in premises and
conclusions by requiring that, for any sets of propositions u and v, u ` v if and only if
a ` b, for some finite a ⊆ u,b ⊆ v. This will secure also a compactness of the resulting
consequence relation.
A set of propositions u is a theory of a Scott consequence relation ` if u 0 u, where u
denotes the set-theoretic complement of u. The following lemma shows that theories can
be seen as sets of propositions that are closed with respect to the sequents of a consequence
relation.
Lemma 3.1. u is a theory of a Scott consequence relation ` if and only if u ` a implies
u∩ a 6= ∅, for any set of propositions a.
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Scott theories can be considered as “multiple-conclusion” analogues of theories of a
Tarski consequence relation. Note, however, that Scott theories do not have all the usual
properties of deductively closed theories. Most importantly, intersections of Scott theories
are not in general theories. Nevertheless, due to compactness, we still have the following
Theorem 3.2.
(1) If u is a theory and v a set of propositions such that v ⊆ u, then u contains a minimal
theory u′ including v.
(2) If u is a theory disjoint from v, then u is contained in a maximal theory u′ disjoint
from v.
In particular, the above theorem implies that any theory of ` is included in a maximal
theory and contains a minimal theory of `.
Any set of sets of propositions E generates a Scott consequence relation `E defined as
follows:
a `E b ≡ for any u ∈ E , if a ⊆ u, then b ∩ u 6= ∅.
The basic result about Scott consequence relations, called Scott Completeness Theorem
in [7], says that theories of a Scott consequence relation form the canonical semantics of
the latter. Let T` be a set of all theories of a Scott consequence relation `. Then we have
Representation Theorem. ` = `T` .
An important consequence of this theorem is that Scott consequence relations are
uniquely determined by their theories.
Note that a Tarski consequence relation is also determined by the set of its theories.
However, the set of theories of any Tarski consequence relation is closed with respect
to intersections, and consequently not all sets of theories constitute exactly the theories
of some Tarski consequence relation. In addition, a Tarski consequence relation always
admits a set of all propositions of the language as its (greatest) theory. In this respect,
Scott consequence relations have a definite advantage for our subsequent applications in
that they provide a more tight correspondence between sets of theories and consequence
relations. In fact, the correspondence is exact for finite Scott consequence relations that
have a finite number of theories: if `E is a consequence relation generated by a finite set of
sets of propositions E , then it can be shown that E will coincide with the set of all theories
of `E .
In a general case, however, if `E is generated by an arbitrary set E , then any set from
E will be a theory of `E , but `E may have other theories as well. A set E will be called
compact, if it coincides with the set of all theories of `E . The above-mentioned feature of
Scott consequence relation can now be formulated as saying that any finite set of theories
is compact.
Supraclassicality
Let us consider now consequence relations in a language containing the usual classical
connectives {∨,∧,¬,→}.  will denote the classical entailment with respect to these
connectives.
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A usual Tarski consequence relation is called supraclassical if it satisfies the following
condition:
If a A, then a `A. (Supraclassicality)
Thus, a Tarski consequence relation is supraclassical, if it subsumes classical inference.
A Tarski consequence relation will be called classical if it is supraclassical and satisfies
the deduction theorem: a,A ` B always implies a ` A→ B . Such consequence relations
are commonly used in the literature on belief change for describing the underlying logic.
Classical entailment  coincides with the least classical consequence relation. In what
follows, we will always use Th as denoting a provability operator of some classical Tarski
consequence relation, while Thc will denote the provability operator corresponding to the
classical entailment.
A Scott consequence relation will be called supraclassical, if it satisfies Supraclassical-
ity. As can be seen, this rule requires all theories of a Scott consequence relation to be
deductively closed sets.
Supraclassicality allows for replacement of classically equivalent formulas in premises
and conclusions of sequents. In addition, it allows to replace sets of premises by their
classical conjunctions: a ` b will be equivalent to∧a ` b. Multiple conclusions, however,
are not replaceable in this way by their disjunctions.
A supraclassical Scott consequence relation will be called classically consistent if all
its theories are logically consistent. As can be easily checked, this holds if and only if the
sequent ⊥ `, where ⊥ is an arbitrary classical contradiction, belongs to the consequence
relation.
Singular Scott consequence relations
Notice that the set of sequents a ` A with singular conclusions belonging to a Scott
consequence relation ` forms a Tarski consequence relation. We will call the latter the
Tarski subrelation of ` and will denote it by `T . It can be shown that theories of `T
are precisely intersections of theories of ` (including the intersection of the empty set of
theories, the latter being identified with the set of all propositions of the language).
Tarski consequence relations can also be seen as a special kind of Scott consequence
relations. More exactly, there is a one-to-one correspondence between Tarski consequence
relations and singular Scott consequence relations satisfying the following condition:
If a ` b, then a `B, for some B ∈ b. (Singularity)
It is easy to see that singular Scott consequence relations are uniquely determined by
their Tarski subrelations. In what follows, we will always identify Tarski consequence
relations with their associated singular Scott consequence relations.
As we will see, Tarski consequence relations cannot serve as a general framework for
belief change. Nevertheless, we will show that they are sufficient for determining revised
belief sets resulting from singular, one-step changes. This fact will play an important role
in establishing the connection of our approach with the AGM representation in [3].
There is an important weakening of singularity that will be already invariant with respect
to our belief change operations. A Scott consequence relation will be called prime if it has
a least theory. As can be easily shown, primeness amounts to the requirement that ` a
holds only if `A, for some A ∈ a.
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4. Consequence relations as representations of epistemic states
As follows from the above discussion, any epistemic state E generates a supraclassical
Scott consequence relation `E such that belief states of E are theories of `E . Also, the
above Representation Theorem shows that any supraclassical Scott consequence relation
can be seen as generated by some epistemic state. Thus, Scott consequence relations can
be seen as a formalism giving a syntactic representation of epistemic states. Moreover, this
will allow us to drop the restriction to finite epistemic states, made earlier, while preserving
most of their required features, such as the existence of maximal theories. Thus, in what
follows we will consider arbitrary compact epistemic states, that is, sets of theories E that
coincide with the theories of `E .
Notice that the consequence relation associated with an epistemic state should not be
identified with a logic of the agent in some strong sense of the word, something belonging
to her intellectual capabilities independently of the world and available information.
Rather, it can be seen as expressing basic dependence relations holding between her
beliefs, relations that are implicit in the structure of the underlying epistemic state. On
this understanding, A ` B can also be interpreted as saying “We cannot believe in A
without believing in B” or, in short, “Belief in A depends on belief in B”. The possibility
of characterizing epistemic states using associated consequence relations can be rephrased
now in the terminology of [8] as saying that an epistemic state is uniquely characterized
by a set of epistemic dependence judgments that are acceptable with respect to it.
We provide below translations of the main notions defined earlier for epistemic states
into the terminology of consequence relations.
Definition 4.1. A propositionA will be said to be believed in a consequence relation `, if
it belongs to all maximal theories of `. The set of all believed propositions will be called a
belief set of ` and denoted by K`.
Notice that for ordinary classical consequence relations belief in A collapses to
provability of A in `, that is, to ` A. Thus, only in the supraclassical case the definition
provides us with a nontrivial concept.
Definition 4.2. A propositionA will be said to be disbelieved in a consequence relation if
A ` holds.
A proposition is disbelieved in a consequence relation ` if it does not belong to any
theory of `. Notice that any sequent of the form a ` is reducible to ∧a `. Consequently,
the following lemma shows, in effect, that beliefs associated with a consequence relation
are uniquely determined by its set of disbeliefs.
Lemma 4.1. A is believed in ` iff, for any a, A,a ` implies a `.
Notice that the reverse dependence does not in general hold: two consequence relations
having the same belief set may have different sets of disbeliefs.
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A consequence relation ` will be called determinate if it has a greatest theory. In
this case the belief set K` will coincide with this greatest theory. The following lemma
provides a syntactic characterization of determination.
Lemma 4.2. A consequence relation is determinate iff, for any set a, a ` implies A `, for
some A ∈ a.
Tarski consequence relations and their epistemic states. As we already mentioned, a
Tarski consequence relation can be considered as a special kind of Scott consequence
relations. However, any Tarski consequence relation admits the set of all propositions
as its greatest theory. This implies, in particular, that our notion of a belief set becomes
trivialized for such consequence relations, since it will invariably coincide with the greatest
(inconsistent) theory. Speaking more generally, the inconsistent maximal theory of a Tarski
consequence no longer carries some nontrivial information about the associated epistemic
state, but rather constitutes a “by-product” of its structural properties (more exactly, of the
fact that it has no rules without conclusions). However, it turns out to be reasonable to
identify an epistemic state associated with a Tarski consequence relation with the set of its
consistent theories. In particular, a belief set of a Tarski consequence relation will coincide
then with the intersection of its maximal consistent theories. So, we will introduce the
following
Definition 4.3. A proposition A will be said to be believed in a supraclassical Tarski
consequence relation `, if it belongs to all maximal consistent theories of `. The set of
all believed propositions will be called a belief set of `.
Notice that, according to the above definition, a belief set of a Tarski consequence
relation will be always consistent.
If ` is a supraclassical Tarski consequence relation, we will write a ` as a shorthand for
a ` f . Now, having this (defined) notion at our disposal, we can use our earlier definitions
of disbelief and determination in the context of Tarski consequence relations. It can be
easily checked, in particular, that the above Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 will remain valid in our
new context.
4.1. Grounded consequence relations
We will describe now Scott consequence that correspond to grounded epistemic states.
Let Th be an arbitrary classical consequence relation and B a set propositions. A Scott
consequence relation will be called generated by a set of propositions B relative to Th if it
is generated by the set of theories {Th(B) | B ∈B}.
As we will show now, there exists a purely internal characterization of such consequence
relations. To begin with, for any supraclassical Scott consequence relation `, we will
denote by Th` the classical consequence relation defined as follows:
A ∈ Th`(a) iff `
∧
a→A.
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It can be shown that Th` is a greatest classical consequence relation included in `. As
we will see, it is this consequence relation that can be seen as the underlying logic of a
given Scott consequence relation and its associated epistemic state.
The following notion defines an important class of propositions by their role in a Scott
consequence relation.
Definition 4.4.
(1) If u is a theory of a Scott consequence relation ` such that
u= Th`(A),
for some proposition A, then u will be called a ground theory of `, while A will be
said to be a ground proposition of `.
(2) A Scott consequence relation will be called grounded if it is generated by a set of its
ground theories.
As the following result shows, grounded consequence relations provide an exact
description of consequence relations generated by a set of propositions.
Theorem 4.3. A supraclassical Scott consequence relation` is grounded iff it is generated
by a set of propositions with respect to some classical consequence relation.
As we have seen, there is an intimate connection between grounded epistemic states and
flocks of theories from [5]. The following description extends this correspondence to the
associated consequence relations (and infinite flocks).
A consequence relation will be called generated by a flock F with respect to a classical
consequence relation Th if it is generated by a set of theories
{Th(w) |w⊆ u, for some u ∈F}.
In this case ` will be called flock-generated by F .
As before,w∧ will denote the set of all conjunctions of propositions fromw. As a special
case, ∅∧ will denote a classical tautology>.
The following result shows that flock-generated consequence relations coincide, in
effect, with a special case of grounded consequence relations.
Theorem 4.4. A consequence relation is flock-generated iff it is prime and grounded.
The proof of Theorem 4.4 shows that any consequence relation generated by a flock F
is generated, in effect, by a set of propositions
BF =
⋃{
u∧ | u ∈F}.
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4.2. Basic propositions and base-generated consequence relations
Similarly to base-generated epistemic states, base-generated consequence relations are
consequence relations that are generated by all subsets of some base.
Definition 4.5. Let Th be a classical consequence relation and B a set propositions.
A consequence relation will be called base-generated by a pair (B,Th) if it is generated by
a set of theories {Th(u) | u⊆ B}. In this case B will be called a base of ` (relative to Th).
As can be seen, base-generation is a special case of flock-generation when the flock
contains only one set of propositions. Consequently, any base-generated consequence
relation will already be grounded. More exactly, base-generation by B amounts to a
generation by a set of propositions B∧.
A set of propositionsB will be called ∧-closed, if, for any A,B ∈B, A∧B also belongs
to B. Then we immediately obtain
Corollary 4.5. ` is base-generated iff it is generated by a ∧-closed set of propositions.
It is easy to see that Th(B) is the greatest theory, or belief set, of a base-generated
consequence relation, while Th(∅) is its least theory. Thus, base-generation implies
primeness and determination.
We will show now that propositions from a base can also be characterized in terms of
their behavior in a consequence relation. For any set of propositions w, we will denote by
A→w the set of implications {A→ B | B ∈w}.
Definition 4.6. A proposition B will be called basic in a supraclassical Scott consequence
relation if a,B ` b always implies a ` B→ b.
As follows from the definition, basic propositions satisfy the deduction theorem, the only
property needed to turn a supraclassical consequence relation into classical one. In other
words, basic propositions are, in a sense, propositions that behave in a fully classical way
in our supraclassical context. The following result provides a semantic characterization of
such propositions.
Theorem 4.6. A is a basic proposition of ` iff, for any theory u of `, Thc({A} ∪u) is also
a theory of `.
The above theorem implies, in particular, that any maximal theory of ` should contain
A. Consequently, we have
Corollary 4.7. Any basic proposition of ` is believed in `.
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We are going to show now that the set of all basic propositions forms a base of a
base-generated consequence relation. We begin with demonstrating that any proposition
belonging to some base of a base-generated consequence relation is a basic proposition.
Lemma 4.8. If B is a base of `, then any proposition from B∧ is a basic proposition of `.
The following result shows that any ground proposition of a base-generated consequence
relation will already be basic.
Theorem 4.9. A is a basic proposition of a base-generated consequence relation ` iff A
is ground in `.
Recall that any base-generated consequence relation is grounded. Moreover, the set of
basic propositions can be easily shown to be ∧-closed. Consequently, we immediately
obtain the following
Corollary 4.10. A consequence relation ` is base-generated iff the set of its basic
propositions forms a base of ` (relative to Th`).
Thus, the set of all basic propositions of a base-generated consequence relation can
be seen as its canonical base. This shows, in particular, that base-generated consequence
relations provide an adequate and complete representation for base-generated belief states.
4.3. Default-generated consequence relations
Default-generated consequence relations are generated by all consistent subsets of some
set of propositions.
Definition 4.7. Let Th be a classical consequence relation and B a set propositions.
A consequence relation will be called default-generated by a pair (B,Th), if it is generated
by a set of theories
{Th(u) | u⊆ B & u is Th-consistent}.
B will then be called a default base of ` (relative to Th) and its elements will be called
defaults of `.
Default-generation is another special case of flock-generation when the flock contains
all maximal consistent subsets of some set of propositions. Consequently, any default-
generated consequence relation will also be grounded. In addition, any such consequence
relation will be classically consistent.
Default-generated consequence relations “almost coincide” with base-generated conse-
quence relations. Thus, any base generated consequence relation will be either default-
generated by itself (if it is classically consistent), or it can be transformed into such by
adding a sequent ⊥` to it (which amounts to deleting the inconsistent theory Th(⊥)).
326 A. Bochman / Artificial Intelligence 108 (1999) 309–352
Similarly to basic propositions, defaults can also be characterized by their behavior in a
consequence relation.
Definition 4.8. A proposition B will be called a default in ` if a,B ` b always implies
a `B→ b,¬B .
Notice that if b above is non-empty, a ` B → b,¬B is reducible to a ` B → b.
Consequently, in such cases defaults will behave in a “fully classical” way, exactly as
basic propositions. In particular, the following semantic characterization of defaults can be
easily obtained from the corresponding result for basic propositions.
Theorem 4.11. A is a default proposition of ` iff, for any theory u of `, either ¬A ∈ u,
or Thc({A} ∪ u) is also a theory of `.
Note, however, that default propositions are not always believed in a consequence
relation, since it may happen that ¬A is also admissible. Still, if a consequence relation
is default-generated, its defaults constitute a “canonical default base”. This result can be
obtained by an easy modification of the corresponding result for base-generation.
5. Contractions of epistemic states
In this section we are going to define a general contraction operation producing deletion
of propositions from epistemic states. Our guiding idea will be that such an operation
should result in disbelieving these propositions. And a most natural way to achieve this
consists in a removal of all admissible belief states that include them.
Definition 5.1. Let E be an epistemic state. A contraction of E with respect to a set of
propositionsw is an epistemic state, denoted by E −w, that is determined by the set of all
admissible belief states from E that are disjoint from w.
A singular (or ordinary) contraction is a contraction by a singleton set {A}, otherwise it
will be called a multiple contraction (cf. [12]).
A contraction of an epistemic state generates a certain change in its belief set. Clearly, if
A belongs to the belief set, it will be removed from it as a result of its contraction. Notice,
however, that our contraction operation will produce a nontrivial change even if A is not
actually believed, but still constitutes a serious possibility (that is, when it is not disbelieved
also).
As we will show formally later, our contraction operation has a pleasant property of
commutativity, that is, iterated contractions can be performed in any order. Moreover, any
finite multiple contraction can be achieved through a sequence of corresponding singular
contractions. We will show also that contractions preserve the property of groundedness, or
flock-generation. Nevertheless, our construction gives different results from those implied
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by the theory of flock-generated change suggested by Fagin et al. [5]. Let us consider the
following example from their paper.
Example 5.1. An epistemic state, generated by a base {A,B,A↔ B}, is contracted by a
set {A,B}. The resulting epistemic state is determined by a base {A↔ B}. This will also
be a result of contracting the initial state by a sequence of contractions 〈−A,−B〉.
The construction of deletion in [5] gives in the latter case a flock {∅, {A↔ B}} which
is treated, in effect, as identical with its least element {∅}, while in our construction it is
reducible to {{A↔ B}}. As a result, multiple deletions are not equivalent to sequences of
singular deletions in [5].
It can be immediately seen that contractions do not preserve base-generation. Thus,
returning to the example already discussed in Section 1, contracting p ∧ q from an
epistemic state generated by a base {p,q} results in an epistemic state generated by a set of
propositions {p,q}. As can be seen, this epistemic state is not base-generated (notice that
this set is not ∧-closed). In our present context, this is simply a sign that base-generated
epistemic states cannot serve as a general framework for belief change. Actually, the same
example shows also that even the set of all determinate epistemic states does not constitute
an adequate framework for representing belief change.
Remark 5.1. Suppose for a moment that we allow disjunctions of base propositions as
legitimate elements of the base (such a solution was studied by Hansson in [15]). Then
in the above example we could take {p ∨ q} as representing the contracted base, and
it would give us the desired new belief set. Still, we claim that such a solution will be
inadequate. Notice that a subsequent deletion of p from this new base does not produce any
effect, since p is already not believed in it. However, if we take the initial base {p,q} and
delete both p ∧ q and p, then q will be believed in the resulting epistemic state. Speaking
more generally, taking intersections of the preferred alternatives may lead to a loss of
information. This loss is not “seen” so far as we are seeking to find belief sets produced by
one-step changes, but it will be revealed in subsequent changes. As we will see, this is also
the reason why Tarski consequence relations are inappropriate for representing epistemic
states.
5.1. Contractions of consequence relations
We will give now a syntactic characterization of our contraction operation as an
operation on consequence relations. As will be seen, such a reformulation will provide
us with a useful tool for studying such changes.
Definition 5.2. A contraction of a consequence relation ` with respect to a set of
propositionsw, denoted by `−w , is a least consequence relation including ` and sequents
A `, for all A ∈w.
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The following lemma provides a direct description of the contracted consequence
relation.
Lemma 5.1. For any finite sets a and b, a `−w b iff a ` b,w.
Now we will show that contraction of a consequence relation corresponds to contraction
of the associated epistemic state, that is, to removal of belief states containing the
propositions being contracted.
Theorem 5.2. If a consequence relation ` is generated by a set of theories T , `−w is
generated by the set of all theories from T that are disjoint from w.
Among other things this theorem implies that contractions preserve finiteness and
groundedness of consequence relations.
As can be seen from the definition of contraction, `−w is a least extension of ` in which
all propositions from w are disbelieved. Moreover, the notion of disbelief can be defined
in terms of contractions. The following simple result will play an important role in what
follows.
Lemma 5.3. A proposition A is disbelieved in ` iff `−A coincides with `.
For any consequence relation `, we will denote by `〈−A1,...,−An〉 the result of applying
to ` a sequence of contractions of Ai in that order. Our next result shows that a sequence
of contractions always amounts to a multiple contraction.
Theorem 5.4. `〈−A,−B〉 = `−{A,B}.
This result immediately implies that contractions commute, that is,
`〈−A,−B〉 = `〈−B,−A〉 .
Consequently, the order of iterated contractions is inessential, and any finite multiple
contraction can be achieved through a sequence of corresponding singular contractions.
The properties of contractions, described below, constitute their basic “structural”
features. They will be used later to give an abstract characterization of our contraction
operation.
To begin with, the following lemma shows that contractions of A∧B and {A,B} can be
considered, respectively, as “joins” and “meets” of singular contractions with respect to A
and B .
Lemma 5.5.
(1) `−(A∧B) = `−A⋂ `−B ;
(2) `−{A,B} is a least consequence relation containing both `−A and `−B .
The following result provides another “lattice” property of contractions.
Lemma 5.6. If A is disbelieved in `−B , then `−(A∧B) coincides with `−A.
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The following result shows that the Tarski subrelation of any Scott consequence relation
is sufficient to determine belief sets resulting from singular contractions. This result is
important in establishing the correspondence between our theory and the AGM framework
in [3].
Lemma 5.7. Let `T be a Tarski subrelation of a Scott consequence relation `. Then, for
any proposition A, the belief set of `−A coincides with the belief set of `T−A.
Though adequate for “one-step” singular contractions, Tarski subrelation will produce
different iterative and multiple contractions. For example, if ` is generated by a set of
propositions {p,q}, then contracting both p and q will give ∅ as the set of generating
propositions, while the same contraction for `T will retain p ∨ q in the resulting belief
set. Notice that this result goes against our intuitions, since p ∨ q is a purely derivative
proposition that was present in the initial belief set solely due to the presence of p and q .
Finally, we want to justify an informal description of epistemic states, given at the
beginning of Section 2. According to this description, epistemic states could be determined
by their belief “outputs” resulting from contractions.
Two consequence relations will be called contraction-equivalent if they produce
identical belief sets under any contraction. Then the following result shows, in effect, that
any epistemic state is uniquely determined by such contracted belief sets.
Theorem 5.8. Two consequence relations are contraction-equivalent only if they coincide.
The above theorem allows to answer also a similar question posed by Fagin et al. in [5].
Two flocks will be called contraction-equivalent if they produce the same belief sets under
any contraction. The above result implies then that this can hold only if they generate the
same consequence relation. Consequently, two contraction-equivalent flocks will give the
same results for any subsequent belief change operation. In the terminology of [5], they
will be equivalent forever.
5.2. Abstract belief contraction systems
We will give now a description of the contraction operation in terms of a set of postulates
describing its behavior. The starting point of our characterization is the following simple
observation:
Lemma 5.9. For any supraclassical consequence relation, a ` b iff contraction of ` with
respect to b ∪ {∧a} coincides with contraction of ` with respect to b.
The above equivalence can be formulated as saying that a ` b holds if and only if b
can be disbelieved only if ∧a is also disbelieved. This result shows, in particular, that
a consequence relation is uniquely determined by the set of its possible contractions.
This will allows us to describe properties of contraction in an abstract way that does
not presuppose the knowledge about what an epistemic state is. Our construction will
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remind the reader Gärdenfors’ dynamic representation of classical logic, given in [8],
where propositions are identified with functions on epistemic states.
An abstract belief contraction system is a pair 〈E, ] [〉, where E is a set of objects called
epistemic states, while ] [ is a mapping from the set of propositions to the set of functions
on E. For any proposition A and an epistemic state E ∈ E, we will denote by E]A[ the
result of applying a function ]A[ to E ; the epistemic state E]A[ will be said to be obtained
by contracting E with respect to A. We will use also the notation E]A,B[ as a shorthand
for E]A[]B[.
A propositionAwill be said to be disbelieved in an epistemic state E , if E]A[= E . As can
be seen from Lemma 5.3 above, this definition agrees with the definition of disbelief given
earlier. In addition, Lemma 4.1 can be used to give an adequate definition of propositions
believed in an epistemic state:
Definition 5.3. A proposition A will be said to be believed in an epistemic state E ∈ E iff,
for any proposition B , A∧B is disbelieved in E only if B is disbelieved in E .
Thus, the basic notions associated with epistemic states are definable in the above
framework. Actually, we will show now that the formalism of belief contraction systems is
equivalent in its expressive power to that of supraclassical consequence relations.
The following set of rationality postulates will be shown to provide a complete
description of belief contraction systems.
(C1) If A↔ B, then E]A[= E]B[ (logical equivalence)
(C2) E]A,A[= E]A[ (idempotence)
(C3) E]A,B[= E]B,A[ (commutativity)
(C4) If E]A,B[= E]B[, then E]A∧B[= E]A[ (inversion)
As can be seen, the first three postulates are not specific for contraction functions (they
are valid, for example, for the above mentioned Gärdenfors’s belief models). So the only
nontrivial contraction postulate is (C4). It says that if A is disbelieved in E]B[, then
contractions of E with respect to A∧B and A produce the same resulting epistemic state
(see Lemma 5.6).
It can be shown that Inversion can be strengthened to the equivalence:
E]A,B[= E]B[ if and only if E]A∧B[= E]A[.
Taken together with other properties of contraction, the above equivalence shows, in
effect, that the set of contraction functions forms a lattice in which ]A,B[ and ]A ∧ B[
play, respectively, the roles of meet and join of ]A[ and ]B[.
Due to commutativity, for any finite set of propositions a, we can safely denote by E]a[
the result of contracting E with respect to all propositions in a in some order.
Now we are going to assign any epistemic state E a “canonical” consequence relation
`E as follows:
a `E b iff E]b ∪ {∧a}[= E]b[.
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Our next result shows that the above correspondence provides an adequate translation
of epistemic states into consequence relations which, in addition, “translates” abstract
contraction functions into contractions of associated consequence relations.
Theorem 5.10. For any epistemic state E ∈ E, `E is a supraclassical consequence
relation. Moreover, for any proposition A, `E]A[ coincides with the contraction of `E with
respect to A.
The above result shows that our specific representation for the notion of an epistemic
state can also be obtained as a by-product of a certain reasonable behavior of such states
under belief change.
5.3. Foundational belief contraction functions
As can be expected, a contraction of an epistemic state (or a consequence relation)
produces a change in its belief set. Consequently, any epistemic state E generates a certain
belief contraction function, namely the function assigning each proposition A a belief set
of E −A. The following definition gives a corresponding description for belief contraction
functions generated by consequence relations.
Definition 5.4. A belief contraction function generated by a consequence relation ` is a
function (denoted by K`−A) assigning each proposition A the belief set of `−A.
K`−A can be seen as a result of contracting the belief set K` with respect to A.
Any such belief contraction function generated by some epistemic state will be called
foundational.
A detailed description of such foundational belief contraction functions and their
comparison with AGM contractions are given in [3]. We show there that such functions
preserve much of the “rationality” behind AGM contractions. In particular, for determinate
epistemic states the corresponding belief contraction will satisfy all the AGM postulates
except recovery (K–6) and the last “connectedness” postulate (K–8).
The description in [3] is based on the following observation, which is an immediate
consequence of Lemma 5.7 above.
Theorem 5.11. If `T is a Tarski subrelation of a Scott consequence relation `, then ` and
`T determine the same belief contraction function.
As a result, the class of foundational belief contraction functions coincides with the
class of belief contraction functions generated by (supraclassical) Tarski consequence
relations. This property of generated belief change functions will hold also for the
other two operations on epistemic states studied later, namely expansions and revisions.
Consequently, so far as we are interested only in belief functions resulting from one-step
changes (which is the main concern of the AGM theory), we can restrict our attention to
functions generated by more familiar Tarski consequence relations.
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Despite the above mentioned similarity between foundational belief contraction func-
tions and AGM contractions, it can be shown that the former satisfy also the following
characteristic property:
(K-8f) If A ∈K−B, then K−(A∧B)⊆K−A. (persistence)
This postulate does not follow even from the full list of the AGM postulates. So,
our framework produces an alternative understanding of belief contractions that is not
subsumed by the AGM theory. In fact, we show in [3] that foundational belief contractions
constitute a “partial-order” generalization of severe withdrawals suggested recently by Rott
and Pagnucco in [26]. Nevertheless, we show also that AGM contractions are representable
in our framework via a certain combination of belief change operations on epistemic states.
5.4. Contraction of base-generated consequence relations
A study of contractions constitutes the main subject of base-oriented studies in belief
change. This is due to the fact that base contractions do not satisfy recovery, and
consequently they are not definable in terms of revisions. On all accounts, however,
revisions are still definable in terms of contractions and expansions via Levi identity (see
below). This makes contraction a more basic operation.
Base-generated epistemic states have many interesting specific features that do not hold
for a general case. Thus, we will show now that any such state is uniquely determined by
its associated belief contraction function. As a result, it is possible in principle to give an
abstract characterization of “base-generated” contractions in terms of the properties of the
associated belief contraction functions. However, as can be seen from Hansson’s results in
[15,17], no characterization of this kind is going to be simple. So, we will state here only
the basic facts.
Our first result shows that the Tarski subrelation of a base-generated Scott consequence
relation ` is uniquely determined by its associated belief contraction function.
Theorem 5.12. If ` is a base-generated consequence relation, then A ` C holds iff, for
any proposition B , A ∈K`−B implies C ∈K`−B .
In fact, the above property can be seen as a “logical source” of Hansson’s symmetry
postulate [17]. An additional consequence of the above result that plays an important role
in Hansson’s characterization is that in the finite case any theory of a base-generated
consequence relation has the form K−A, for some A (this follows immediately from
compactness of finite sets of theories).
Clearly, contractions cannot preserve all the original basic propositions. The following
result shows that a basic proposition will remain to be a basic proposition of a contracted
consequence relation if and only if it is still believed in it.
Theorem 5.13. A basic proposition B of a consequence relation ` will also be basic in
`−w iff B ∈K`−w.
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Finally, it turns out that basic propositions can also be “restored” from the associated
belief contraction function. The following result shows that if arbitrary contractions of
propositions of the form B→C preserve the belief in B , then B is a basic proposition.
Lemma 5.14. B is a basic proposition of ` iff, for any c, B is believed in `−(B→c).
The above results demonstrate that, for base-generated states, the associated belief
contraction functions are already sufficient for recovering their structure. This property,
however, is highly specific for base-generated states and is not extendable even to finite
grounded epistemic states.
6. Expansions
The general aim of the expansion operation, studied in this section, consists in adding
propositions to our beliefs. There exists, however, a number of ways to achieve this in
the framework of epistemic states. In most cases, the differences will influence only
iterated belief change operations. Nevertheless, such differences between various kinds
of expansions can be seen as one of the main varying parameters in our approach to belief
change. A number of such operations of expansion are also studied in [3].
It might appear at first sight that adding a proposition A to an epistemic state should
amount to elimination of all admissible belief sets of an epistemic state that do not contain
A. Such an operation, however, would miss the intended meaning of adding A as a new
belief rather than an established (known) fact. Note, for example, that if A is disbelieved,
the result of such an expansion would be an empty epistemic state. Furthermore, such an
expansion would be “ineliminable” in the sense that a subsequent attempt to contract A in
this case will again result in an empty epistemic state.
Generally speaking, the differences between various kinds of expansions amount to
determining the degree of firmness with which we will believe the added proposition. In
this respect, the foundational approach adopted in this paper suggests that a strongest way
of adding new belief consists in making it a basic proposition of the new epistemic state.
This is captured by the notion of a basic expansion described below.
6.1. Basic expansions
Basic expansions introduce new propositions into an epistemic framework in such a
way that they are treated as freely combined with other believed propositions. As we will
see, if an epistemic state is base-generated, such an expansion amounts to an addition of a
proposition to the base. This understanding of expansions is presupposed practically in all
“base-oriented” approaches to belief change.
For any set of theories T , we will denote by T+w the set of theories{
Thc(u∪ v) | u ∈ T and v ⊆w
}
.
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Definition 6.1. Let T be the set of theories of a consequence relation `. For any set of
propositions w, the consequence relation determined by the set of theories T+w will be
called a basic expansion of ` with respect to w and denoted by `+w .
Thus, basic expansion with respect to w is obtained by adding arbitrary subsets of w
to all theories of a consequence relation and taking their logical closure. Notice that an
expansion of a consequence relation results also in “expanding” the set of its theories, so
the new consequence relation will actually be a subrelation of the source one. In other
words, a `+w b will always imply a ` b.
The following technical lemma shows that instead of the set of all theories, we can safely
choose any set of theories generating a given consequence relation.
Lemma 6.1. If ` is generated by a set of theories T , then `+w is generated by the set
T+w .
The next theorem confirms that `+w is indeed a consequence relation we are looking
for.
Theorem 6.2. `+w is a greatest subrelation of ` that makes all propositions from w basic
ones.
The following consequence of the above result shows that basic propositions of a
consequence relation can be described in terms of basic expansions:
Corollary 6.3. A is a basic proposition of ` iff `+A coincides with `.
For singular expansion with respect to a proposition A, `+A is a consequence relation
determined by the set
T ∪ {Thc(u∪ {A}) | u ∈ T },
where T is a set of theories of `. In other words, expansion ofA is determined by addingA
to each of the theories of a consequence relation and taking logical closure of the result. The
following theorem provides a direct syntactic description of such expanded consequence
relations.
Theorem 6.4. a `+A b iff a ` b and A→ a `A→ b.
As for contractions, expansions of epistemic states generate corresponding operations
on their belief sets.
Definition 6.2. For any consequence relation ` and any set w, K`+w will denote the set
of all propositions believed in `+w . The corresponding function will be called a belief
expansion function generated by `.
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Recall that ordinary AGM expansions are defined directly via the equation K+A =
Th(K ∪ {A}) (see [8]). The following simple example shows, however, that our generated
belief expansion functions are distinct, in general, from AGM expansions.
Example 6.1. Let ` be generated by two propositions {p,q} with respect to the classical
entailment. Then the belief set K` coincides with Th(p ∨ q). Now, expanding ` with
A = p→ q will result in a consequence relation having Th(p ∧ q) as its only maximal
theory. Consequently, the latter will coincide with K`+A. But Th(K` ∪A) will coincide
in this case with Th(q).
Still, it is easy to see that if ` is determinate, K`+A will coincide with Th(K` ∪ {A}).
So in this case the underlying consequence relation will be of no importance in determining
the resulting belief set, since it can be obtained by a direct addition of new propositions to
the source belief set. However, identical expansions of belief sets can be produced by dif-
ferent basic expansions, and this will be revealed in subsequent contractions and revisions
of the resulting belief set. Thus, adding eitherA∧B or {A,B} will produce the same belief
set, but only the latter expansion makes both A and B basic propositions. Consequently,
subsequent contraction of A∧B will delete all new theories introduced by adding A∧B ,
but will usually retain theories of the form Thc(u,A) and Thc(u,B) introduced by adding
{A,B}. In the principal case this would retain A∨B in the resulting belief set.
The following result shows that, just as for contractions, basic multiple expansions can
be simulated by singular expansions.
Theorem 6.5. For any consequence relation, `+w∪{A} = `〈+w,+A〉.
Thus, basic multiple expansions are equivalent to sequences of singular expansions of
their elements. Another consequence of the above result is that basic expansions commute,
and hence they can be performed in any order.
An interesting fact about basic expansions is that an expansion with respect to A
commutes with a contraction with respect to ¬A. In other words, a sequence of changes
〈−¬A,+A〉 always produces the same change in epistemic states as the sequence
〈+A,−¬A〉. As we will see later, in both cases we will obtain a revision of an epistemic
state with respect to A.
In dealing with infinite epistemic states and their associated consequence relations we
should always check that our operations on epistemic states exactly correspond to the
counterpart operations on consequence relations. In our present case, we need to show
that if T is a set of all theories of `, its expansion `+A does not have new theories beyond
T+A:
Theorem 6.6. The set of all theories of `+A coincides with T+A.
The following consequence of the above result shows that expansions preserve basic
propositions.
Corollary 6.7. Any basic proposition of ` remains a basic proposition of `+A.
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The following example shows that expansions may transform a singular Scott conse-
quence relation into a non-singular one.
Example 6.2. It is easy to check that expanding the classical entailment  with atomic
propositions p and q gives us a consequence relation ` generated by a base {p,q}. This
consequence relation is not singular: we have p ∨ q ` p,q , though neither p ∨ q ` p, nor
p ∨ q ` q .
The above example shows once more why ordinary Tarski consequence relations are
inadequate for representing changes of epistemic states. Moreover, if an expansion of a
Scott consequence relation produces an inconsistent belief set, it will be distinct from the
(consistent) belief set generated by expanding its Tarski subrelation. Still, the following
result shows that in the consistent case both generate the same expanded belief set:
Theorem 6.8. If `T is a Tarski subrelation of a Scott consequence relation `, then, for
any A, either K` +A is inconsistent, or K` +A coincides with K`T +A.
Lemma 6.1 above immediately implies the following result showing that expansions
preserve both groundedness and base generation.
Lemma 6.9. If ` is generated by a set of propositions B, then `+A is generated by the set
BA = B∪ {A∧B | B ∈ B}.
This result implies, in particular, that expansion of a base-generated consequence
relation with respect to a proposition A amounts simply to adding A to the base. Thus,
in such cases our notion of basic expansion coincides with the corresponding notion of
expansion in common base-oriented approaches. It agrees also with the notion of insertion
for flocks described in [5].
Our last result in this section shows a way of constructing the expanded consequence
relation on the basis of a given set of sequents (“dependence rules”) determining the source
consequence relation. Notice that this task is less trivial than the corresponding task for
contractions, since we need to remove certain sequents from a consequence relation, rather
than add some.
Theorem 6.10. If ` is a consequence relation, `+A is a least consequence relation `∗
satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) If a ` c, then a `∗ c,A.
(2) If a ` c and ¬A logically implies all propositions from a, then a `∗ c.
The above theorem suggests the following method of constructing the expanded
consequence relation. Let R be a set of generating sequents of `. In order to construct
a set RA of generating sequents of `+A, we can do the following:
– For any sequent a ` b from R, add a sequent a ` b,A to RA;
– Derive from R all minimal sequents a ` b such that ¬A logically implies all a’s, and
add these sequents to RA.
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6.2. Conditional expansions
As we said, expansions can differ in the degree of firmness they assign to the
newly added beliefs. In practice, additions of new beliefs are often conditional on other
propositions we believe, e.g., on evidences we have or the reliability of witnesses that
give us new information, etc. This idea can be captured using the notion of a conditional
expansion introduced below.
Definition 6.3. Let A and B be propositions and T the set of all theories of a consequence
relation `. Then `+(A|B) will denote a consequence relation determined by the set of
theories
T(A|B) = T ∪ {Th(u∪A) | u ∈ T and B ∈ u}.
This consequence relation will be said to be obtained by a conditional expansion of `.
As can be seen, a conditional addition of A relative to B is obtained by expanding each
admissible belief state satisfying B with A. Basic expansion can be seen as a special case
of conditional expansion when B is a tautology. The following theorem provides a direct
description of a consequence relation resulting from a conditional expansion. Its proof can
be obtained by a small change in the corresponding proof for basic expansions.
Theorem 6.11. If ` is a consequence relation, then
a `+(A|B) b iff a ` b and B,A→ a `A→ b.
Conditional expansion can be seen as a qualitative counterpart of transmutation
operations suggested in [29]. Just as the latter, it can raise the “degree of firmness” even
for already believed propositions.
If the condition B is disbelieved in `, the conditional expansion +(A | B) will have no
effect for it. But if B is believed, then A will also be believed in the resulting consequence
relation. Moreover, if A was disbelieved previously, then the belief in A will depend on B
in the resulting consequence relation, that is, we will have A `+(A|B) B . In other words,
our willingness to believe in A in what follows will be conditional on acceptance of B .
And this will remain to be so until A will receive some additional ground or justification.
6.3. Default expansions
Recall that a most simple and natural interpretation of non-determinate epistemic states
consists in viewing them as generated by a certain set of defaults, or expectations. This
suggests that reasonable expansions should also be capable of adding new defaults to our
epistemic states.
Unlike basic propositions that are supposed to be freely conjoined to any admissible
belief state, defaults are restricted in this respect by the principle of non-contradiction; we
accept defaults only if there are no contradictory evidence. Consequently, we suggest to
define a default expansion of an epistemic state E with respect to propositionA as obtained
by adding A to all admissible states of E that are consistent with A.
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For any set of theories T , we will denote by TδA the set of theories
T ∪ {Th(u∪ {A}) | u ∈ T & ¬A /∈ u}.
Definition 6.4. A default expansion of a consequence relation ` with respect to a
proposition A is a consequence relation, denoted by `δA, that is determined by the set
of theories TδA, where T is a set of theories of `.
Again, default expansions behave very similar to basic expansions. In fact, the only
distinction between them is that if ¬A belongs to some admissible belief state (that is,
it is not disbelieved), then the basic expansion with respect to A will make the resulting
epistemic state classically inconsistent. Default expansions, however, will always preserve
classical consistency. Still, it is easy to see that any default expansion can be obtained as a
combination of the corresponding basic expansion, followed by a contraction with respect
to falsity:
`δA = `〈+A,−⊥〉 .
The proof for the following syntactic characterization of default expansions can be
obtained by a slight modification of the proof for Theorem 6.4.
Theorem 6.12. For any consequence relation ` and any A,
a `δA b iff a ` b and A→ a `A→ b,¬A.
Notice that if b 6= ∅, then A→ a ` A→ b,¬A is reducible to A→ a ` A→ b, and
hence a `δA b will hold in this case if and only if a `+A b.
Just as for basic expansions, we have
Theorem 6.13. `δA is a greatest subrelation of ` that makes A a default proposition.
In addition, any default of ` remains a default of `δA, so default expansions preserve
default propositions. We have also that if a consequence relation is generated by a set of
propositions B, then `δA is generated by B and all consistent conjunctions A∧ B , where
B ∈ B. This implies, in particular, that default expansions will preserve groundedness and
default generation.
7. Revisions
An operation of basic expansion may result in an epistemic state having an inconsistent
belief set. To secure that addition of a set w to a consequence relation will produce
only consistent theories, we need the following notion. An epistemic state E will be
said to be admissible for adding a set of propositions w if every belief state from E is
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logically consistent with w. The following definition describes the corresponding notion
for consequence relations.
Definition 7.1. A consequence relation ` will be called admissible for (adding) a set of
propositionsw if, for any finite a ⊆w, ¬∧a ` holds.
As can be seen, in the case of adding a finite set a, the admissibility condition amounts
simply to validity of a sequent ¬∧a `. In other words, admissibility of a amounts
to disbelieving ¬∧a. Clearly, if a consequence relation is admissible for some set of
propositions, it is classically consistent, that is, the set of all formulas is not its theory.
Moreover, we have
Lemma 7.1. ` is admissible for a set w iff `+w is a classically consistent consequence
relation.
Thus, the admissibility of a consequence relation for some expansion amounts to
disbelieving certain propositions. As was shown earlier (see Lemma 5.3), the latter is
equivalent to a closure of the consequence relation with respect to a certain contraction.
Consequently, we immediately obtain
Lemma 7.2. A consequence relation ` is admissible for a set w if and only if it coincides
with `−w¬ , where w¬ = {¬
∧
a | a ⊆w}.
Therefore, in order to make a consequence relation admissible, we need to perform first
appropriate contraction producing disbelief in these propositions. This means, in particular,
that a classically consistent expansion with respect to w is always equivalent to a sequence
of changes 〈−w¬,+w〉. In other words, to produce consistent basic expansions, we can
always employ a compound belief change operation 〈−w¬,+w〉 that is definable for all
consequence relations.
A well-known principle, called Levi identity in [8], identifies a revision of a belief set
with respect to a proposition A with a sequence of changes consisting of contracting ¬A
and subsequent expansion with A. Generalizing this principle to consequence relations, we
introduce the following definition.
Definition 7.2. For any consequence relation ` and any set of propositions w, we will
denote by `∗w a consequence relation `〈−w¬,+w〉. This consequence relation will be called
a basic revision of ` with respect to w.
As can be seen, revisions are definable for any consequence relation and always produce
a classically consistent belief set. Moreover, if a consequence relation is admissible for
adding a set w of propositions, than its revision with respect to w coincides with an
expansion with respect to w. Thus, revisions coincide with expansions on admissible
consequence relations. Furthermore, it is easy to see that basic expansions coincide
with default expansions on admissible consequence relations. This means that default
expansions could be safely used instead of basic expansions in the above definition of
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revisions. Thus, as far as revisions are concerned, the difference between these two kinds
of expansions becomes inessential.
Recall that a contraction with respect to ¬A always commutes with a basic expansion
with respect to A. So, for a singular revision ∗A, the order of performing its underlying
contraction and expansion does not matter; in each case we will obtain the same revised
epistemic state. In other words, Levi’s identity for revised epistemic states can be reversed
(cf. [16]). Note, however, that this commutativity property is not extendable to multiple
revisions.
Another interesting property of basic revisions is that, instead of basic expansions, we
could safely use default expansions in their definition: as can be easily seen, `∗w is always
equal to `〈−w¬,δw〉. In other words, the difference between basic and default expansions
becomes inessential so far as we are only revising epistemic states.
As before, we will denote by K`∗w the belief set of `∗w . This set can be seen as a
result of revising the belief set K` in order to accept w. Note, however, that Levi identity
for revised consequence relations does not imply the more familiar Levi identity for belief
sets:
K`∗A= Th
({A} ∪ (K`−¬A)).
The reasons for possible violations of this principle lie in the fact that it takes from the
intermediate contracted epistemic state only its belief set and thereby “forgets” the actual
alternatives that produced the latter.
The following counterexample involves a finite epistemic state that is both determinate
and grounded.
Example 7.1. Let ` be generated by the set of three propositions {q, (p→ q)∧ r,¬p ∧
q ∧ r} with respect to the classical entailment. Its belief set K` will be Thc(¬p ∧ q ∧ r).
Then, the revision of ` with respect to p will produce the following generating set:
{q, (p→ q)∧ r,p ∧ q,p ∧ q ∧ r}.
The associated revised consequence relation will again be determinate with Thc(p ∧
q ∧ r) as its greatest theory. Consequently, the latter will constitute the revised belief set
K`∗p. However, K`−¬p is equal in our case to Thc(q ∨ (¬p ∧ r)), and consequently
Th({p} ∪ (K`−¬p)) will coincide with the smaller set Th(p ∧ q).
The above example provides a further evidence for our claim that forgetting the actual
alternatives and replacing them by their intersections, as is done in common approaches
to belief change, may lead to a loss of information. Still, an interesting (and somewhat
surprising) fact is that revisions of base-generated epistemic states turn out to satisfy Levi
identity for belief sets.
Theorem 7.3. If ` is finite and base-generated, then, for any A,
K`∗A= Th
({A} ∪ (K`−¬A)).
As can be expected, revisions do not commute: the sequence of revisions 〈∗A,∗¬A〉
produces a belief in ¬A and hence does not coincide with 〈∗¬A,∗A〉 that leads to a belief
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in A. Moreover, unlike contractions and expansions, multiple revisions are not always
simulated by singular ones (though we always have `〈∗A,∗B〉 ⊆`∗{A,B} – see the proof
of the next theorem). Still, the following result gives necessary and sufficient conditions
for both commutativity and reducibility of multiple revisions.
Theorem 7.4. The following conditions are equivalent for any consequence relation `
and any propositions A and B:
(a) ¬A∨¬B `¬A,¬B;
(b) `〈∗B,∗A〉 = `〈∗A,∗B〉;
(c) `∗{A,B} = `〈∗A,∗B〉;
(d) `〈∗B,∗A〉 ⊆`〈∗A,∗B〉.
The condition (a) above says, in effect, that ¬(A ∧ B) is a derived proposition that
is admissible in the epistemic state only when either ¬A or ¬B is an admissible belief.
The above result then shows that in this case the revisions with respect to A and B are
compatible and do not “interfere” with each other; consequently, they can be performed in
any order, as well as simultaneously.
The so-called Harper (or Gärdenfors) identity (see [8]) states that contraction of a belief
set K with respect to A is precisely the common part of K and its revision with respect to
¬A, that is,
K−A= (K ∗ ¬A)∩K .
This identity also does not hold for our belief operations. To see this, it is sufficient to
note that it implies recovery for contractions that is not valid in our framework. Still, the
following result shows that the corresponding “generalized” Gärdenfors identity holds for
epistemic states: if E is an epistemic state, E − A its contraction with respect to A and
E ∗ ¬A its revision with respect to ¬A, then
E −A= E ∩ E ∗ ¬A.
In other words, the contracted epistemic state contains exactly the admissible belief
states that are common to both the source epistemic state and its revision with respect to
¬A. The following theorem gives a syntactic description of this result:
Theorem 7.5. `−¬A is a least consequence relation containing ` and `∗A.
7.1. Accessible consequence relations
Finally, let us consider the question what epistemic states and consequence relations
can be generated from some “initial” ones by applying singular contractions and basic
expansions.
Our distinction between belief and knowledge suggests that a starting point of belief
change, a “tabula rasa” of beliefs, can be represented by an epistemic state containing a
single admissible belief state. We will call such epistemic states unitary ones. All that is
believed in such an epistemic state coincides with what is known in it. In other words,
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such states do not involve “genuine” beliefs that are distinct from knowledge. 4 Our
belief change operations, however, can transform such states into ones involving nontrivial
beliefs. Accordingly, any epistemic state (or a consequence relation) that can be obtained
from some unitary one by applying singular contractions and expansions will be called
accessible.
Since both contractions and expansions preserve groundedness and primeness, we
immediately obtain that any accessible epistemic state is finite, grounded and prime.
Moreover, the following result shows that any such epistemic state will be accessible.
Theorem 7.6. An epistemic state is accessible iff it is finite, prime and grounded.
The above result demonstrates that grounded epistemic states and consequence relations
can be seen as an exact representation framework for finite belief change operations on
epistemic states.
It is interesting to note that using only basic revisions as belief change operations, we
cannot “access” in this way all grounded epistemic states:
Example 7.2. Let us consider an epistemic state generated by a set of propositions
{>,p,¬p} with respect to Thc. To see that it cannot be produced by a sequence of basic
revisions, note that theories Thc(p) and Thc(¬p) could only be created by a direct revision
with respect to p and ¬p, respectively, while each of these revisions removes the effect of
the other.
So, belief change cannot be reduced to belief revision in the narrow sense.
7.2. Belief revision functions
Revisions of an epistemic state generate a corresponding belief revision function on its
belief set. As for contractions and expansions, such belief functions are determined already
by associated Tarski consequence relations:
Theorem 7.7. If `T is a Tarski subrelation of a Scott consequence relation `, then ` and
`T determine the same belief revision function.
Thus, all belief change functions described in the paper are representable using ordinary
Tarski consequence relations.
A detailed description of belief revision functions generated by epistemic states is given
in [3]. In particular, we establish a close connection between them and nonmonotonic
preferential inference relations from [19]. Thus, belief revision functions generated by
epistemic states can be seen as a natural generalization of AGM revisions. In particular,
they extend the scope of the correspondence between belief revision and nonmonotonic
inference from rational inference relations to a broader class of preferential ones.
Moreover, in order to satisfy all the AGM postulates for revision, we need only to
4 Compare this with Gärdenfors’ identification of knowledge with full belief in [8].
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restrict the class of generating consequence relations. This will demonstrate that the
AGM “rationality” is not necessarily tied to the coherentist paradigm, but can also be
reconstructed on a purely foundationalist basis.
8. Conclusions
We have argued in Section 1 that in order to provide a more adequate and uniform
representation of belief change, we need a notion of an epistemic state more complex than
simply a set of beliefs. Such an epistemic state should embody information about various
dependencies among believed propositions that would be sufficient for determining the
results of its reasonable revision in response to new data. In other words, a comprehensive
representation of epistemic states ought to be sufficiently informative for determining the
results of all subsequent changes made to it. In this respect, it seems that the suggested
identification of epistemic states with sets of belief states, as well as their representation in
terms of Scott consequence relations that encode such dependencies, provide a minimum
of complexity required for this purpose.
The results and constructions described in the paper show that epistemic states provide
a constructive representation framework that subsumes the two major approaches to
belief change. Thus, we have shown that the base change paradigm is representable in
our approach using some special class of epistemic states and consequence relations. In
an accompanying paper [3] we show that the AGM theory can also be represented in
our framework by viewing epistemic entrenchment as another special case of a Scott
consequence relation. This can be seen as a step towards the unification of the two principal
belief revision paradigms. We have seen, however, that the framework of epistemic states
admits reasonable kinds of belief change operations that go far beyond what is strictly
necessary for representing the two “traditional” theories of belief change. Our notion of an
epistemic state provides a powerful generalization extending significantly the expressive
capabilities of current approaches. Some of the possibilities have been discussed in the
present paper. Further details can be found in [3] where we compare our framework with
other constructions made in the AGM tradition.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the main results
Theorem 4.3. A supraclassical Scott consequence relation` is grounded iff it is generated
by a set of propositions with respect to some classical consequence relation.
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Proof. If ` is grounded, let us take B to be the set of ground propositions of ` and Th` to
be an appropriate classical consequence relation. Then the set {Th`(B) | B ∈ B} is clearly
a set of theories generating `.
In the other direction, we need only to prove that if ` is generated by a pair (B,Th),
any theory from the (generating) set {Th(B) | B ∈ B} is a ground theory of `. To this
end, we will prove that, for any B ∈ B, Th(B) = Th`(B). Indeed, if A ∈ Th(B), then
B → A ∈ Th(Bi), for any Bi ∈ B, and hence ` B → A, that is, A ∈ Th`(B). In the
other direction, if ` B→ A, then B ` A. But Th(B) is a theory of ` and B ∈ Th(B).
Consequently, we obtain A ∈ Th(B). 2
Theorem 4.4. A consequence relation is flock-generated iff it is prime and grounded.
Proof. Let F be a flock generating `. Since Th(∅) is a theory, ` is a prime consequence
relation. Due to compactness of Th, finite subsets of sets from F are sufficient for
determining the generating consequence relation. Moreover, such finite sets can be always
replaced by their conjunctions. In accordance with this, we will denote by BF the set of
propositions
⋃{u∧ | u ∈F}. Then it is easy to check that ` is generated by BF relative to
the same classical consequence relation.
In the other direction, if B is a set of propositions generating a prime consequence
relation ` with respect to Th, let us denote by FB the flock containing all sets {B}, where
B ∈ B. Let B0 be a proposition generating the least theory of `. We will denote by Th0
a classical consequence relation defined as Th0(a)= Th(a,B0). Then FB will be a flock
generating ` with respect to Th0. 2
Theorem 4.6. A is a basic proposition of ` iff, for any theory u of `, Thc({A} ∪u) is also
a theory of `.
Proof. Let u be a theory of `. If Thc({A} ∪ u) is not a theory of `, there must exist
finite sets a ⊆ u, c⊆ Thc({A} ∪ u) such that a,A` c. If A is a basic proposition, we have
a ` A→ c, and since u is a theory, there is C ∈ c such that A→ C ∈ u. Consequently,
C ∈ Thc({A} ∪ u), contrary to the assumption that c is disjoint from Thc({A} ∪ u).
In the other direction, if a 0 A→ c, then there is a theory u such that a ⊆ u and
A→ c ⊆ u. But then Thc({A} ∪ u) is a theory of ` that includes A and a and is disjoint
from c. Therefore, A,a 0 c, and hence, A is a basic proposition. 2
Lemma 4.8. If B is a base of `, then any proposition from B∧ is a basic proposition of `.
Proof. Let ` be a consequence relation generated by a base B with respect to Th, and
B ∈ B∧. Now, if a 0 B → c, there must exist B1 ∈ B∧ such that a ⊆ Th(B1) and
B → c ⊆ Th(B1). The later condition implies that c is disjoint from Th(B ∧ B1). In
addition, Th(B∧B1) includes bothB and a. ButB∧B1 belongs to B∧, and hence a,B 0 c.
Therefore, B is a basic proposition of `. 2
Theorem 4.9. A is a basic proposition of a base-generated consequence relation ` iff A
is ground in `.
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Proof. Since Th(∅) is a theory of a base-generated consequence relation `, if B is a basic
proposition of `, Th(B) is also a theory of `, and hence, B is ground in `.
Let ` be a consequence relation generated by a base B with respect to Th, and assume
that A is ground, that is, Th`(A) is a theory of `. If a 0 A→ c, there must exist B ∈ B∧
such that a ⊆ Th(B) and A→ c⊆ Th(B). But B is a ground proposition of `, and hence
Th(B)= Th`(B) (cf. the proof of Theorem 4.3). Consequently, we haveB→ c⊆ Th`(A),
and henceA 0 B→ c (since Th`(A) is a theory). Therefore there must exist B1 ∈B∧ such
that A ∈ Th(B1) and B→ c ⊆ Th(B1). The later condition implies that c is disjoint from
Th(B ∧ B1). In addition, Th(B ∧ B1) includes both A and a. But B ∧ B1 belongs to B∧,
and hence a,A 0 c. Therefore, A is a basic proposition of `. 2
Lemma 5.1. For any finite sets a and b, a `−w b iff a ` b,w.
Proof. It is easy to check that a consequence relation `∗ defined as follows:
a `∗ b ≡ a ` b,w
is a supraclassical Scott consequence relation containing `. Moreover, C `∗, for any
C ∈w. Since `−w is a least such consequence relation, we immediately obtain that `⊆`∗.
If a ` b,w, then a `−w b,w, and hence a `−w b, c, for some finite c⊆w. But C `−w ,
for any C ∈ c. Hence, applying Cut, we obtain a `−w b. Thus, `−w coincides with `∗. 2
Theorem 5.2. If a consequence relation ` is generated by a set of theories T , `−w is
generated by the set of all theories from T that are disjoint from w.
Proof. Let Tw be a set of theories from T that are disjoint from w. Then C `Tw holds for
any C ∈w. Hence `−w is included in `Tw .
If a 0−w b, then a 0 b,w, and hence there is a theory u from T that includes a and
disjoint from both b and w. Consequently, u belongs to Tw , and therefore a 0Tw b. Thus,`−w coincides with `Tw . 2
Lemma 5.3. A proposition A is disbelieved in ` iff `−A coincides with `.
Proof. If A ` holds, then it is easy to see that a ` b,A holds iff a ` b holds. In the other
direction, if the latter equivalence holds, we have, in particular, that A ` A should imply
A `, and hence A is disbelieved in `. 2
Theorem 5.4. `〈−A,−B〉 = `−{A,B}.
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, a `〈−A,−B〉 b holds iff a `−A b,B iff a ` b,A,B . By the same
lemma, the latter amounts also to a `−{A,B} b. Hence the result. 2
Lemma 5.5.
(1) `−(A∧B) = `−A⋂ `−B ;
(2) `−{A,B} is a least consequence relation containing both `−A and `−B .
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Proof. (1) Immediate from the fact that a ` b,A∧B holds in a supraclassical consequence
relation if and only if a ` b,A and a ` b,B .
(2) Clearly, `−{A,B} includes both `−A and `−B . In addition, if `∗ is any consequence
relation that includes the latter two, it includes also ` and contains both A `∗ and B `∗.
But then `−{A,B} is included in `∗, since it is defined as a least consequence relation
satisfying these conditions. 2
Lemma 5.6. If A is disbelieved in `−B , then `−(A∧B) coincides with `−A.
Proof. A `−B holds iff A ` B . The latter implies A ` A ∧ B , and hence A ∧ B is
provably equivalent to A in `. But then a ` b,A∧B holds iff a ` b,A. This concludes the
proof. 2
Lemma 5.7. Let `T be a Tarski subrelation of a Scott consequence relation `. Then, for
any proposition A, the belief set of `−A coincides with the belief set of `T−A.
Proof. We will show that ` and `T have the same maximal theories that do not include
A. Clearly, if u is a maximal theory of ` that does not include A, then it is also a maximal
such theory in `T . Assume now that u is a maximal theory of `T that does not include
A. Since u 0T A, we have also u 0 A, and hence there is a maximal theory u0 of ` that
does not include A and such that u⊆ u0. Since u0 is also a theory of `T , we have that u
coincides with u0. 2
Theorem 5.8. Two consequence relations are contraction-equivalent only if they coincide.
Proof. Let `1 and `2 be two contraction-equivalent consequence relations. If they are
distinct, they must have distinct theories. Assume that u is a theory of `1, but not of `2.
We contract both these consequence relations with a set u of all propositions that do not
belong to u. Clearly, u is still a theory and, moreover, a greatest theory of `1−u, and hence it
coincides with its belief set. Assume that u is also a belief set of `2−u. Since any belief set
is an intersection of maximal theories, and `2−u does not have theories above u, the latter
should be a theory of `2−u, which is impossible, since u is not a theory of `2. 2
Lemma 5.9. For any supraclassical consequence relation, a ` b iff contraction of ` with
respect to b ∪ {∧a} coincides with contraction of ` with respect to b.
Proof. For any sets c, d , c `−(b∪{∧a}) d holds if and only if c ` d,b,∧a. Similarly,
c `−b d amounts to c ` d,b. Now, if a ` b, these two sequents are equivalent, and this
gives the direction from left to right. In addition, if `−(b∪{∧a}) coincides with `−b ,
then, in particular, a `−(b∪{∧a}) should imply a `−b . But the former sequent belongs to
`−(b∪{∧a}), and hence a `−b holds, which is reducible to a ` b. 2
Theorem 5.10. For any epistemic state E ∈ E, `E is a supraclassical consequence
relation. Moreover, for any proposition A, `E]A[ coincides with the contraction of `E with
respect to A.
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Proof. We show first that `E is a supraclassical consequence relation.
Supraclassicality. Assume that A  B . We have E]B,B,A[= E]B,A[ by Idempotence,
and hence E]B,A ∧ B[= E]B,B[ by Inversion. But A ∧ B is logically equivalent to A,
and hence E]B,A[= E]B[ by Equivalence and Idempotence. The latter is equivalent to
A `E B , and we are done.
Monotonicity. To show Monotonicity, it is sufficient to demonstrate that an arbitrary
proposition can be always added to the premises and conclusions of a valid sequent.
Now, E]b ∪ {∧a}[= E]b[ implies E]b ∪ {A} ∪ {∧a}[= E]b ∪ {A}[ by Commutativity,
and hence any proposition can be added to the conclusions. In addition, if E]B[= E ,
then E]B,A[= E]A[, and hence by Inversion E]A ∧ B[= E]B[, that is, E]A ∧ B[= E .
Consequently, a propositionA can also be always added to the premises of a valid sequent.
Cut. If E]B,A[= E]B[ and E]A∧B[= E , then E]A∧B[= E]A[ by Inversion from the
first equality, and hence E]A[= E . This shows the validity of the Cut rule.
Finally, a `E]A[ b amounts to E]{A} ∪ b ∪ {∧a}[= E]{A} ∪ b[. By Commutativity, the
latter is equivalent to E]b ∪ {A} ∪ {∧a}[= E]b ∪ {A}[, which is translatable as a `E b,A.
But the latter is equivalent to a `E−A b. This concludes the proof of the theorem. 2
Theorem 5.12. If ` is a base-generated consequence relation, then A ` C holds iff, for
any proposition B , A ∈K`−B implies C ∈K`−B .
Proof. The direction from left to right is immediate. Assume that A 0C. Then there must
exist a base proposition B0 such that A ∈ Th`(B0) and C /∈ Th`(B0). Let us denote by B
a proposition B0→ C. Then B0 belongs to K−B (see Lemma 5.14), and hence A also
belongs toK−B . In addition,C /∈K−B . Indeed, otherwiseB would belong toK−B , and
hence `B0→ C that contradicts the assumption that C /∈ Th`(B0). Thus, the implication
from right to left also holds. 2
Theorem 5.13. A basic proposition B of a consequence relation ` will also be basic in
`−w iff B ∈K`−w.
Proof. We will prove first the following auxiliary result:
Auxiliary Lemma. Let B be a basic proposition of `. Then B will also be a basic
proposition of `−w iff B→A `w, for each A ∈w.
Proof. Assume that B is a basic proposition of `−w . B,B→A `A is a valid sequent of
`, and hence also B,B→ A ` w, for each A ∈ w. The latter sequents are equivalent to
B,B→ A `−w . Since B is a basic proposition of `−w , we conclude that B→ A `−w ,
that is, B→A `w.
In the other direction, if a,B `−w b, then a,B ` w,b, and hence a,B ` c, b, for
some finite c ⊆ w. Since B is a basic proposition of `, we obtain a ` B → c,B→ b.
But B→ A ` A, for any A ∈ c, and consequently we have a ` c,B→ b and therefore
a `w,B→ b. But the latter sequent is equivalent to a `−w B→ b, and hence B is a basic
proposition of `−w . 2
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Now if B is basic in `−w , it is clearly believed in `−w . Assume that B is believed in
`−w As in the proof of the auxiliary lemma, we have B,B→ A `−w , for any A ∈ w.
By Lemma 4.1 we conclude B→ A `−w , and now the result follows from the auxiliary
lemma. 2
Lemma 5.14. B is a basic proposition of ` iff, for any c, B is believed in `−(B→c).
Proof. Notice first that a,B ` c is always equivalent to a,B `B→ c. Consequently, B is
a basic proposition if and only if a,B `B→ c always implies a `B→ c. Now the result
follows from Lemma 4.1. 2
Lemma 6.1. If ` is generated by a set of theories T , then `+w is generated by the set
T+w .
Proof. Let T ` be a set of all theories of `. Since T ⊆ T `, T+w is included in T+`w .
Consequently, `+w is included in `T+w .
If a 0+w b, then there exists a subset v ofw and a theory u of ` such that a ⊆ Thc(v∪u)
and b is disjoint from Thc(v ∪ u). Due to compactness, v can be taken to be a finite
set. Consequently,
∧
v→ a is a subset of u and u is disjoint from ∧v→ c. Therefore,∧
v→ a 0∧v→ c, and hence there exists a theory u0 ∈ T that includes ∧v→ a and is
disjoint from ∧v→ c. But then Thc(v ∪ u0) is a theory from T+w that includes a and is
disjoint from b, and hence a 0T+w b. Therefore, `+w coincides with `T+w . 2
Theorem 6.2. `+w is a greatest subrelation of ` that makes all propositions from w basic
ones.
Proof. If T is a set of theories of `, then T+w is clearly the least extension of T satisfying
the condition that, for any A ∈ w, if u belongs to it, then Thc(u,A) also belongs to it.
Consequently, T+w is a least set of theories that makes all propositions from w basic, and
hence any other consequence relation having this feature will be included in `+w . 2
Theorem 6.4. a `+A b iff a ` b and A→ a `A→ b.
Proof. We will show that the consequence relation `∗ determined by the latter condition
is generated by the set T+A, where T is a set of theories of `.
By the Representation Theorem, a ` b holds iff b ∩ u 6= ∅, for any theory u of ` such
that a ⊆ u. Similarly, A→ a `A→ b holds iff b ∩ Thc({A} ∪ u) 6= ∅, for any theory u of
` such that a ⊆ Thc({A} ∪u). Therefore, if T is a set of theories of `, both these sequents
hold simultaneously iff b ∩ u0 6= ∅, for any theory u0 from T+A such that a ⊆ u0. But the
latter is equivalent to a `+A b, and we are done. 2
Theorem 6.5. For any consequence relation, `+w∪{A} = `〈+w,+A〉 .
Proof. If T is a set of theories of `, then it is easy to see that T+w∪{A} is representable as
a union of T+w and the set {Thc(u∪ {A}) | u ∈ T+w}. Hence, `+w∪{A} can be obtained by
first adding w and then adding A. 2
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Theorem 6.6. The set of all theories of `+A coincides with T+A.
Proof. Let u be a theory of `+A. We show first that if u /∈ T , thenA ∈ u. Indeed, otherwise
we would have u ` u and A ∈ u, and consequently a ` c,A, for some a ⊆ u, c⊆ u. By the
above theorem, the latter implies a `+A c,A and hence u `+A u—a contradiction with the
fact that u is a theory of `+A.
Assume now that A ∈ u. Let us show that A→ u 0 u. Indeed, otherwise there are B ∈ u
and c ⊆ u such that A→ B ` c. This implies A→ B `+A c and consequently u `+A u,
contrary to the fact that u is a theory of `+A.
The above condition implies that there must exist a theory u0 of ` such that A→
u ⊆ u0 ⊆ u. But if B ∈ u, for some proposition B , then A→ B ∈ u0, and consequently
B ∈ Thc({A}∪u0). Thus, u coincides with Thc({A}∪u0), and hence it belongs to T+A. 2
Corollary 6.7. Any basic proposition of ` remains a basic proposition of `+A.
Proof. Let B be a basic proposition of ` and u a theory of `+A. If u is also a theory of
`, then Thc(u,B) is a theory of `, and hence it is a theory of `+A. Otherwise there is a
theory of u′ of ` such that u= Thc(u′,A). But then Thc(u′,B) is a theory of `, and hence
Thc(u,B)= Thc(A,Thc(u′,B)) is a theory of `+A. 2
Theorem 6.8. If `T is a Tarski subrelation of a Scott consequence relation `, then, for
any A, either K` +A is inconsistent, or K` +A coincides with K`T +A.
Proof. The “expanded” belief set K` +A is an intersection of all maximal theories of the
form Th(A,u), where u is a maximal theory of `. Hence the result follows from the fact
that ` and `T have the same maximal consistent theories. 2
Theorem 6.10. If ` is a consequence relation, `+A is a least consequence relation `∗
satisfying the following two conditions:
(1) If a ` c, then a `∗ c,A.
(2) If a ` c and ¬A logically implies all propositions from a, then a `∗ c.
Proof. Let `0 be the least consequence relation satisfying the above conditions. Since
`+A satisfies these conditions (this follows immediately from Theorem 6.4), we obtain
that `0 is included in `+A.
If a `+A b, then a ` b and A→ a `A→ b, and hence a `0 b,A andA→ a `0 A→ b.
The latter sequent implies A,a `0 b, and hence applying Cut we obtain a `0 c. Thus, `0
coincides with `+A. 2
Lemma 7.1. ` is admissible for a set w iff `+w is a classically consistent consequence
relation.
Proof. If ` is not admissible for w, we have ¬∧a 0, for some finite a ⊆ w, and hence
there exists a theory u that includes ¬∧a. Let v be a maximal theory containing u.
Then Th(v ∪ w) is a classically inconsistent theory, and hence `+w is not classically
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consistent. In the other direction, if `+w is not classically consistent, one of the “newly
added” theories Th(u∪w) should be inconsistent. But then w must contain a finite subset
a such that u ¬∧a. Since u is deductively closed,¬∧a belongs to u, and consequently
¬∧a 0 holds. Thus, ` is not admissible for w. 2
Theorem 7.3. If ` is finite and base-generated, then, for any A,
K`∗A= Th
({A} ∪ (K`−¬A)).
Proof. Let B be a finite base of `. Since ` is determinate, if A is consistent with B, the
result follows immediately from the fact that revision coincides in this case with expansion.
So, let us assume that B implies ¬A. Let BA denote the set of all maximal subsets of
B that are consistent with A. Then the contracted belief set K`−¬A is an intersection
of all theories Th(bi), for bi ∈ BA, whereas K∗A is an intersection of maximal theories
among all theories of the form Th(A,bi), where bi ∈ BA. As can be easily seen, the
above Levi identity will hold if all theories Th(A,bi) are maximal, that is, when they
are incomparable with respect to set inclusion. We will show that this is indeed the case.
Suppose, on the contrary, that there are b1, b2 ∈ BA such that Th(A,b1)⊆ Th(A,b2). Then
b1 ⊆ Th(A,b2), and hence A,b2 ∧b1. But b1 ∪ b2 cannot already be consistent with
A, and hence b1, b2  ¬A. Combining these two entailments, we immediately conclude
b1 ¬A, which is impossible, since b1 is consistent with A. This concludes the proof. 2
Theorem 7.4. The following conditions are equivalent for any consequence relation `
and any propositions A and B:
(a) ¬A∨¬B `¬A,¬B;
(b) `〈∗B,∗A〉 =`〈∗A,∗B〉;
(c) `∗{A,B}=`〈∗A,∗B〉;
(d) `〈∗B,∗A〉 ⊆`〈∗A,∗B〉.
Proof. Using the definition of revisions in terms of contractions and expansions and
“unpacking” the corresponding characterizations of the latter, a `∗{A,B} b can be shown
to be equivalent to validity of the following four sequents:
a ` b,¬A∨¬B A→ a `A→ b,¬A∨¬B
(A∧B)→ a ` (A∧B)→ b,¬A∨¬B B→ a `B→ b,¬A∨¬B
while a `〈∗A,∗B〉 b is equivalent to
a ` b,¬A,¬B A→ a `A→ b,¬A∨¬B
(A∧B)→ a ` (A∧B)→ b,¬A∨¬B B→ a `B→ b,¬A,¬B.
The above conditions imply that `〈∗A,∗B〉 is always included in `∗{A,B}, that (a) implies
both (b) and (c) and that (b) implies (d). Now, substituting {¬A} for a and ∅ for b in the
sequents for a `〈∗A,∗B〉 b and a `〈∗B,∗A〉 b, we immediately obtain that (d) implies (a).
Similarly, substituting {¬A∨¬B} for a and ∅ for b in the sequents for a `〈∗A,∗B〉 b and
a `{∗A,∗B} b, we obtain that (c) also implies (a). 2
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Theorem 7.5. `−¬A is a least consequence relation containing ` and `∗A.
Proof. Let `∗ be the least consequence relation containing ` and `∗A. Clearly, `∗ is
included in `−¬A, since the latter contains both. Now, we have¬A `∗A, and hence¬A `∗.
But `−¬A is a least consequence relation containing ` and ¬A `. Thus, `∗ coincides with
`−¬A. 2
Theorem 7.6. An epistemic state is accessible iff it is finite, prime and grounded.
Proof. (A sketch) The set B of generating propositions of an epistemic state is partially
ordered by the relation of logical consequence. Hence, we can stratify B into a finite
number of layers Bi determined by the length of a maximal down path in this order.
The desired sequence of changes will then be constructed by induction on the layers as
follows: If Ei is an epistemic state constructed at stage i , then we expand it by adding all
propositions from the layer Bi+1, and then contract all propositions of the form B ∧ B1,
where B ∈ Bi+1 and B1 is any proposition from the same or a lower layer that is not a
logical consequence of B . It is easy to check that each Ei will be generated by all the
propositions from B that belong to layers 6 i . Consequently, the final epistemic state
obtained by this construction will coincide with E . 2
Theorem 7.7. If `T is a Tarski subrelation of a Scott consequence relation `, then ` and
`T determine the same belief revision function.
Proof. K∗A is an intersection of maximal theories among all theories of the form
Th(A,u), where u is some maximal theory of ` that does not contain ¬A. But as is shown
in the proof of Lemma 5.7, ` and `T have the same maximal theories of this kind. This
concludes the proof. 2
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